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CHRISTI



# ***NPDI MATTERS***

*Recommendations to States Parties  
for the April 2013 Ministerial*





## **IKV Pax Christi - Nonukes**

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### **About the project**

No Nukes is IKV Pax Christi's campaign for a world free of nuclear weapons. No Nukes is a partner of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) and hosts the global secretariat of the Abolition 2000 Network. IKV Pax Christi is the joint peace organisation of the Dutch Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) and Pax Christi Netherlands. We work for peace, reconciliation and justice in the world. We join with people in conflict areas to work towards a peaceful and democratic society. We enlist the aid of people in the Netherlands who, like IKV Pax Christi, want to work for political solutions to crises and armed conflicts. IKV Pax Christi combines knowledge, energy and people to attain one single objective: there must be peace!

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## Introduction

The Non Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) was established in September 2010 with the purpose of taking forward the Action Plan contained in the consensus outcome<sup>1</sup> of the 2010 nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. NPDI is a geographically diverse group of ten countries that are actively engaged in disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control discussions, both inside and outside the NPT.

The NPDI states: Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, will meet in The Hague in April 2013 for their sixth Ministerial Meeting. States will discuss progress on several initiatives and objectives the group has put forward. In addition, it is expected that the NPDI meeting will provide the basis for a joint statement on behalf of the group, to be presented at the 2013 NPT Preparatory Committee meeting in Geneva.

This paper examines the composition of the NPDI and assesses some of the contributions made to date. The paper also puts forward recommendations as food for thought for the participants of the April 2013 meeting and beyond.

## Summary of findings

The composition of NPDI is both a strength and a challenge. While the geographic diversity is a strength it is tempered by the fact that five of the ten members are part of NATO and seven are under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The lack of political diversity is challenging, especially when it comes to discussions with nuclear armed countries like China and Russia or with those who are not always 'friendly' to the U.S.

It is on non-proliferation issues that the group speaks with the most unity, and proposals in that regard are necessary to maintain the architecture for a nuclear weapons free world. All ten states are on the forefront of pushing regulatory and treaty based arrangements such as a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and a universalisation of the Additional Protocol. In addition, the NPDI has consistently supported the idea of a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone.

On proposals for specific disarmament efforts, it seems the group has not always found common ground and subsequently, this is the area where NPDI proposals are least developed. Past statements on arms control of the NPDI congratulated Russia and the US with the ratification of New Start and called on both countries to start negotiations on the next round of arms reductions, including non-strategic (or tactical) nuclear stockpiles. From the outset, NPDI joint statements expressed "*deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons*"<sup>2</sup> and consistently referred to the threat to human survival posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their possible use.

Assessments of NPDI's composition and its statements and proposals to date, lead to the following recommendations:

### Non-proliferation

To support efforts towards a fissile materials treaty, the NPDI could reserve space in its reporting format for states to declare existing fissile materials stocks and capabilities.

Statements calling for ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by Annex II states, should make reference to subcritical nuclear experiments as contravening the spirit of the treaty, as a way to encourage broader acceptance by most hold-outs of the CTBT provisions.

NPDI members should increase their own contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency, and refer to that when calling on others to support the work of the agency.

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<sup>1</sup>NPT 2010 Final Document can be found at: [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/50](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/50) (VOL.I)

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.dfat.gov.au/security/npdi-meeting-20100922.html>

## **Disarmament**

NPDI members could do more to encourage a realistic, transparent timeline for further deep reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals.

NPDI members should include in their joint statements the need for reduction, relocation, and dismantlement of current non-strategic nuclear arsenals, and explain how they are working for this in other forums.

NPDI members could encourage the reduced reliance on nuclear weapons in security strategies by issuing national and joint declarations that their security arrangements are not predicated on nuclear weapons, and publicly recognise that retaliation with nuclear weapons on their behalf has the potential to cause grievous environmental harm, and could lead to global famine.

NPDI members, in their national and joint statements to the NPT Preparatory Committee meeting could include the need for a treaty explicitly banning nuclear weapons and leading to their elimination as a complimentary step to current non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.

## **Transparency**

The current proposed format for Nuclear Weapons States reporting to the NPT could be expanded to include room for specific contributions from Non Nuclear Weapons States, The NPDI members could spearhead this by using the format for their own national reporting to NPT.

## **Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences**

The April 2013 Ministerial statement of the NPDI should welcome the recent conference in Norway on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons and encourage all states to participate in the follow-up conference planned in Mexico.

## **Nuclear Weapon Free Zones**

The NPDI could in statements, encourage ratification by the Nuclear Weapons States of relevant protocols to existing Nuclear Weapons Free Zone agreements. They could also discuss, and make reference to, other nuclear weapons free zone proposals including in the Arctic.

## **Education**

NPDI members should organise more national and regional workshops and training courses on topics contributing to non-proliferation and disarmament. NPDI members should seek to provide financial support for youth activities related to this issue, and could include members of youth organisations, students or civil society in their national delegations to international disarmament discussions.

## **Membership**

NPDI could consider enhancing its credibility by including in its membership at least one African state.

## **Civil Society participation**

NPDI could, in addition to including civil society members on its national delegations to disarmament or non-proliferation meetings, hold one session open to civil society at its meetings. It could also consider creating the space for discussion and new thinking by holding an interactive presentation from civil society at its own meetings.

## Who and what is the NPDI?

The stated primary goal of the NPDI is to put forward concrete recommendations towards the full implementation of the Action Plan agreed at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Essentially, the NPDI is an attempt to forge a representative and forward looking group of non-nuclear weapon states that can offer ideas, proposals and advice to nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) member states. This is not an easy feat. To make a difference, the NPDI must be willing to challenge some of the entrenched positions of the nuclear weapon states. At the same time, to get their ear, and their support, the NPDI must make sure not to be discarded by those nuclear weapon states for being too ambitious, too naive or too one-sided.

The credibility of the NPDI is vested in the geographical representativeness of the group, the good standing of its members with regard to existing treaties and agreements and their historical commitment to realistic, practical and targeted proposals to advance non-proliferation and disarmament in general and to specifically implement the 2010 Action Plan.

The ten are in good standing with their non-proliferation and arms control requirements. All ten have ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), implemented the IAEA Additional Protocol (AP), ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Nine of the ten sit in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) (the UAE is an observer); seven participate in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), eight the Wassenaar Arrangement. Six currently sit on the IAEA Board of Governors. Seven are part of the Australia Group and the Zangger Committee. All have ratified or acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear materials (CPPNM). All have participated in the Nuclear Security Summits and all actively support resolution 1540 on preventing terrorist acquisition of materials related to the production of weapons of mass destruction. This demonstrates that on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation matters, the NPDI can be considered a like-minded group.

The good standing of the NPDI members certainly raises their credibility. The question is if the group is unified when it comes to pushing truly new ideas, especially on disarmament. The formulations that have so far come from the NPDI are predicated on fifty year old recipes for a nuclear weapons free world. New proposals, and new methods of addressing them, to unblock existing deadlocks, receive mixed results. For example, all NPDI states supported the Canadian proposal at the UN General Assembly in 2012 for a Group of Governmental Experts on a fissile materials treaty (A/RES/67/53), yet Poland and Turkey abstained from supporting the creation of an Open Ended Working Group to take forward multilateral disarmament negotiations (A/RES/67/56).<sup>3</sup> It calls into question how far NPDI members are willing to think 'outside the box' to achieve the full implementation of the 2010 NPT Action Plan.

The NPDI is divided on some important efforts calling for results on nuclear disarmament. For example, the annual resolution in the UN General Assembly "*Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*" (A/RES/67/33) shows a division between those who still rely on nuclear weapons in their security strategies (Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, Netherlands and Turkey) and those that don't (Chile, Mexico and the UAE) the latter three support this resolution. The 2012 Swiss coordinated statements on the Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences of the use of nuclear weapons was supported by the two Latin American states, but not by the others, although all ten participated in Norway's conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons.

The geographical spread of the NPDI is one of its strengths. Participants come from all continents, except Africa. Europe is perhaps over-represented with Germany, Poland, the Netherlands and Turkey. On the *political* world map though, the membership of the NPDI is rather one-sided. Of the ten states, seven are under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and as such rely heavily on the U.S. nuclear arsenal for their security posture. Japan and Australia enjoy bilateral umbrella-arrangements, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and Turkey are part of NATO's joint deterrence and defence posture which states among other things that that NATO will remain a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Voting results can be found here: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/unga/2012/resolutions>

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/download/bsr/BSR2012Baseline.pdf>

The four European NATO states – besides relying on positive security assurances from the U.S. - also actively engage in planning and training for the use of nuclear weapons. Three of them, Germany, the Netherlands and Turkey host U.S. nuclear weapons on their territories as part of NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements and although Germany and the Netherlands have made it clear over the past years that they hope to see these weapons removed, they are not publicly proposing deadlines or route maps to that effect.

Apart from a direct reliance on U.S. extended deterrence, at least nine of the ten NPDI states host U.S. military personnel and facilities. Germany, Japan and Turkey specifically, have been instrumental for U.S. Military interventions and operations, hosting dozens of U.S. military bases and thousands of U.S. troops. Poland recently welcomed the stationing of U.S. ground personnel, Chile recently agreed to a U.S. military facility.<sup>5</sup> The UAE is a security partner of growing importance for the U.S. in the Gulf Region, hosting among other things Missile Defence radars and interceptors, U.S. special forces and granting the U.S. port-to-call, landing and overfly rights.<sup>6</sup> The Netherlands and Canada have for a long time been close U.S. allies. Canada hosted U.S. nuclear weapons until 1984.<sup>7</sup> Mexico is the only country of the ten that does not host U.S. military personnel and facilities – with the noted exception of U.S. military advisors aiding Mexican counterparts in the Mexican war on drugs.<sup>8</sup>

From the NPDI's entanglement with U.S. interests arise some important questions. First, to what extent do the NPDI's proposals and statements have any credibility with the nuclear weapons states that are not alliance partners of the U.S., namely China and Russia. Second, the question arises why non-nuclear weapon states outside the direct sphere of influence of the U.S. would take heed of the proposals and statements of the NPDI. Why – for example – would countries like Egypt, Brazil, Belarus or South Africa not interpret what the NPDI says as a spin-off from a U.S. interest driven agenda? But also, one can wonder if this close entanglement with U.S. interests allows NPDI members to open doors in Washington that might be closed to other disarmament and non-proliferation advocates?

Concluding, one might say that the geographical spread of the NPDI, in combination with proven good-will from its members count as strengths, but that the apparent bias towards U.S. interests may stand in the way of building support both from other nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. One could ask if NPDI members are confident enough to take positions considering, but not restricted by U.S. interests, and if so will they still be able to offer realistic and practicable proposals and solutions.

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<sup>5</sup> <http://peoplesworld.org/united-states-adds-bases-in-south-america/>

<sup>6</sup> [http://www.uae-embassy.org/uae-us-relations/security\\_2012](http://www.uae-embassy.org/uae-us-relations/security_2012)

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.nonukes.nl/media/files/withdrawal-issues-report-nospread.pdf>

<sup>8</sup> <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41349.pdf>

## NETHERLANDS Example reporting form

| Nuclear doctrine  | State response  |
|---|---|
| Measures taken or in process to diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies | Supported calls within NATO for adaptation of declaratory policies in line with U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. Establishment of the NATO Special Advisory and Consultative Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Committee. However, agreed that <i>“Nuclear weapons are a core component of NATO’s overall capabilities for deterrence and defence”</i>  |
| Measures taken or in process to reduce the operational readiness of the reporting State’s nuclear arsenal                                       | Warheads in close proximity to, but not mounted on delivery vehicles. Readiness time rumoured in months not minutes.  |
| Measures taken or in process to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons  | Adjustment of facility security according to recommendations of 2008 U.S. Air Force Blue Ribbon Report.   |
| Description of negative security assurances (including status and definition) <i>by reporting States</i>  | Through NATO’s new Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, which states <i>“The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote”</i> and <i>“nuclear weapons will not be used or threatened to be used against Non-Nuclear Weapon States that are party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations”</i> |
| Current status and future prospect of the ratification of the relevant protocols to nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties                           | N/A   |
| Current status of consultations and cooperation on entry into force of the relevant protocols on nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties              | N/A   |
| Current status of review of any related reservations about the relevant protocols of nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties by concerned States      | N/A   |
| Nuclear testing   | State response  |
| Current status of ratification of the Comprehensive-Test-Ban treaty   | Annex II State, ratified 23 March 1999  |
| Current status of the reporting State’s policy on continued adherence to the moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions                       | N/A   |
| Activities to promote the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the national, regional and international levels      | NPDI cooperative efforts, including joint statements, letters and demarches   |
| Scheduled policy reviews  | State response  |
| Scope and focus of policy reviews, scheduled or under way, relating to nuclear weapon stocks, nuclear doctrine or nuclear posture               | Review of NATO Strategic Concept and NATO Deterrence and Defence Posture Review completed in 2010 and 2012. Next review and revisions are not scheduled.  |



| Fissile material  | State response   |
|---|--|
| Aggregate amount of plutonium produced <i>for national security purposes</i> (in metric tons)   | 0  |
| Aggregate amount of highly enriched uranium produced <i>for national security purposes</i> (in metric tons)   | Uranium enrichment capabilities through the URENCO consortium, not declared for military purposes.   |
| Amount of fissile material declared excess for national security policies (in metric tons)  | 0  |
| Current status (and any future plan), including the amount and year, of declarations to the International Atomic Energy Agency of all fissile material designated by the reporting State as no longer required for military purposes and placement of such material under Agency or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes | N/A  |
| Current status of the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements to ensure the irreversible removal of such fissile material  | N/A  |
| Current status (and any future plan) of the dismantlement or conversion for peaceful uses of facilities for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons   | N/A  |
| Other measures in support of nuclear disarmament  | State response   |
| Any cooperation among Governments, the United Nations and civil society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities   | NPDI membership; hosting 2014 Nuclear Security Summit; participation in NATO's Special Advisory and Consultative Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Committee; however, there is a gap in current national transparency efforts due to a policy of ambiguity on hosting nuclear weapons assigned to NATO, which obstructs a transparent domestic public and political discussion on current nuclear deployments in the country. |
| Year and official document symbol of regular reports on the implementation of Article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference   | Last report submitted in 2005, NPT/CONF.2005/26  |
| Activities to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education   | Participate in funding a PhD consortium on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament issues. Seminars in Geneva on FMCT, participation in national efforts, including the Hague Programme on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Efforts.  |

## **NPDI Priorities**

Starting in September 2010, the NPDI met five times on a ministerial level, discussing proposals and ideas to “jointly advance the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agendas as mutually reinforcing processes”<sup>9</sup>. The group has repeatedly stressed the fundamental importance of the total elimination of nuclear arsenals as the only guarantee to prevent a nuclear catastrophe and expresses a deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons.

Over the past years, the group has reiterated a step-by-step approach towards a nuclear weapons free world. In this approach, the group has developed a variety of statements, objectives and proposals. In this report, we focus on the most elaborated priorities of the group. These relate to the strengthening of non-proliferation regimes, transparency, reductions of numbers and the role of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon free zones and disarmament education.

## **Transparency and accountability**

The NPDI standard reporting format generated as a response to Action 21 of the 2010 NPT Action Plan is a welcome contribution. It builds on Canada’s history of calling for strengthened reporting and accountability to NPT agreements- and proposals and working papers put forward in previous NPT cycles. A draft form was presented by the NPDI to the five nuclear weapon states for feedback and submitted to the 2012 NPT Prepcom as working paper NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.12.

The NPDI countries should be commended for encouraging the nuclear weapons states to report before the deadline in 2014. The form clearly tries to establish a baseline of information by which to assess future disarmament claims, in the fulfilment of Article VI. What is missing, is a format for countries who rely on nuclear weapons in their own security strategies - those within NATO, and those who have bilateral nuclear umbrella agreements. The proposed form could easily be adapted and filled out by some of these countries, as a way to build confidence, increase transparency, and further establish the baseline by which to assess disarmament commitments.

As another goal of the NPDI is the advancement of a fissile materials cut-off treaty, the group could take the lessons learned in the warhead disarmament verification exercise of the UK and Norway and apply them to a new exercise. The NPDI could work with the IAEA and forward thinking nuclear armed states to develop a test case for evaluating and inspecting existing fissile materials production infrastructure and assess what capacities are needed to develop effective verification methods for their dismantlement, hopefully a component of a future fissile materials treaty.

## **Non-Proliferation**

The NPDI countries are most unified in their approach to non-proliferation issues. Statements consistently highlight the importance of progress on three fronts: starting and concluding a Fissile Materials (Cut-Off) Treaty, entry into force of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and the universalisation of the Additional Protocol.

## **Fissile materials**

All NPDI members agree that negotiations on a fissile materials treaty should take as their basis the Shannon Mandate.<sup>10</sup> The NPDI has done quite a lot in furthering efforts towards a fissile materials treaty, holding seminars, discussions, and supporting the establishment of a Group of Governmental Experts on the subject. As a next step, the NPDI could reserve space on its proposed standard reporting form to declare civilian and military stocks of fissile materials, as well as production capabilities. Complementary to other parts of the form, this would encourage a baseline of information on the fissile materials holdings of all states, thus including the nuclear armed states. These declarations should not be limited to only those fissile materials considered in excess for military purposes. States could also report on their fissile materials holdings for nuclear propelled submarines, research reactors, and could also report on related infrastructure.

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<sup>9</sup> First NPDI Ministerial statement, September 2010, retrieved from: <http://www.dfat.gov.au/security/npdi-meeting-20100922.html>

<sup>10</sup> The Shannon Mandate, CD/1299 can be found at: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/cd/basicinfo/1299.pdf>

## **Nuclear testing**

The NPDI has in every joint statement shown regret about the lack of progress towards the entry into force of the CTBT. The group urges the Annex II states China, The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Egypt, Israel, India, Iran, Pakistan and the United States to ratify the CTBT without delay. Specific proposals are not yet put forward by the group, although it is known that they have through letters and demarches encouraged ratification. What the group could include in its statements, is a reference to the subcritical tests that some nuclear weapon states have done in recent years. Although technically permissible under the CTBT, these tests defeat the spirit of the treaty as they can lead to qualitative improvements of nuclear arsenals. In addition, the subcritical tests feed the argumentation of some of the last Annex II states refusing to ratify the Treaty.

## **Verification**

Finally, statements of the NPDI have stressed the importance of recognising and universalising the Additional Protocol as the international standard in verification of non-proliferation. A very practical contribution of the NPDI in advancing the effectiveness of verifications and safeguarding the objectiveness and quality of the Agency, is to take the lead in a proposal to increase the regular contributions to the IAEA in order that the agency can significantly increase its budget and remove the 'zero real growth' constraint placed on it. The agency is continually tasked with additional responsibilities, yet is only able to do this through extra-budgetary support for key functions.

## CHILE Example reporting form

| Delivery vehicles   | State response   |
|---|--|
| Number of nuclear warhead delivery systems by type (missiles, aircraft, submarines, artillery, other)   | N/A  |
| Reductions (in numbers) in 2012   | N/A  |
| Aggregate number of delivery systems dismantled in 2012   | N/A  |
| Nuclear doctrine  | State response   |
| Measures taken or in process to diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies | Ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco 9 October 1974.   |
| Measures taken or in process to reduce the operational readiness of the reporting State's nuclear arsenal                                       | N/A  |
| Measures taken or in process to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons  | N/A  |
| Description of negative security assurances (including status and definition) <i>by reporting States</i>  | Through Protocol II, Article 3 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, ratified by all recognised Nuclear Weapons States, although with reservations. |
| Current status and future prospect of the ratification of the relevant protocols to nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties                           | N/A  |
| Current status of consultations and cooperation on entry into force of the relevant protocols on nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties              | N/A  |
| Current status of review of any related reservations about the relevant protocols of nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties by concerned States      | N/A  |
| Nuclear testing   | State response   |
| Current status of ratification of the Comprehensive-Test-Ban treaty   | Annex II State, ratified 12 July 2000  |
| Current status of the reporting State's policy on continued adherence to the moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions                       | N/A  |
| Activities to promote the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the national, regional and international levels      | NPDI cooperative efforts, including joint statements, letters and demarches  |
| Scheduled policy reviews  | State response   |
| Scope and focus of policy reviews, scheduled or under way, relating to nuclear weapon stocks, nuclear doctrine or nuclear posture               | N/A  |

| Fissile material  | State response  |
|---|---|
| Aggregate amount of plutonium produced <i>for national security purposes</i> (in metric tons)   | 0   |
| Aggregate amount of highly enriched uranium produced <i>for national security purposes</i> (in metric tons)   | All U.S. origin HEU has been cleaned out of the country.                      |
| Amount of fissile material declared excess for national security policies (in metric tons)  | 0   |
| Current status (and any future plan), including the amount and year, of declarations to the International Atomic Energy Agency of all fissile material designated by the reporting State as no longer required for military purposes and placement of such material under Agency or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes | N/A   |
| Current status of the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements to ensure the irreversible removal of such fissile material  | N/A   |
| Current status (and any future plan) of the dismantlement or conversion for peaceful uses of facilities for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons   | N/A   |
| Other measures in support of nuclear disarmament  | State response  |
| Any cooperation among Governments, the United Nations and civil society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities   | Hosted national seminars, past cooperation with OPANAL on regional workshops. |
| Year and official document symbol of regular reports on the implementation of Article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference   | Last reports submitted in 2010, NPT/CONF.2010/2                               |
| Activities to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education   | Hosted national seminars, past cooperation with OPANAL on regional workshops. |

## Disarmament

The NPDI has made it clear that one of its priorities is to “*focus on efforts to further reduce the number of nuclear weapons, including tactical nuclear weapons, and to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security strategies, concepts, doctrines and policies.*”<sup>11</sup> It is unclear how the NPDI intends to achieve this.

### Lower numbers

The NPDI has played a positive role in discussions on developing a more objective baseline for calculating the numbers of weapons that each nuclear weapon state holds. In addition, the group has applauded the entry into force of the U.S – Russia arms reduction treaty New START. As China, and France have indicated, they will only enter into discussions on reductions if and when the U.S. and Russia have reduced their holdings to levels comparable to the other nuclear weapon states. The NPDI, using its political proximity to the U.S, France and the UK, could do much more to stimulate a realistic, transparent international debate on developing timelines for further (deep) reductions.

### All categories

The NPDI statements have repeatedly called for inclusion of non-strategic (or tactical) nuclear weapons in next rounds of disarmament negotiations. The five NATO States of the NPDI have a key role to play in that respect. NATO’s continued stationing of nuclear weapons in non-nuclear weapons States, as well as the training of their military to use these weapons is one of the main obstacles keeping the U.S. and Russia from dealing with the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons. For the three NPDI states hosting such non-strategic weapons on their territories specifically, their credibility is at stake, as a majority of countries regards them as violating the spirit, if not the letter, of NPT Articles 1 and 2 which prohibit any transfer of nuclear weapons to Non-Nuclear Weapon States. Given this special responsibility of a large section of the NPDI, it is imperative that the NPDI as a group further develops its statements on the necessity to reduce, relocate and dismantle current non-strategic nuclear weapon stockpiles.

### Reduced reliance

The NPDI has called for a reduced role of nuclear weapons in security and defence doctrines and policies. It could link this call to the groups efforts to develop a standard reporting form for nuclear weapon states (see below). Space could be reserved on the form for declarations of States on the question when the use of nuclear weapons would be acceptable, if at all. Is it acceptable to use them in response to an attack with biological weapons or chemical weapons? In response to energy supply attacks that put thousands of lives at risk? Is there ever a scenario where it would be acceptable to use nuclear weapons against a country that is party to a nuclear weapons free zone agreement? If not, is there any reason to maintain reservations to existing NWFZ agreements and the security assurances contained therein?

The seven NPDI members currently enjoying positive security assurances under the U.S. umbrella have a special responsibility in this respect. As they rely on nuclear weapons in their own security strategies, they could take a positive step by issuing national declarations that their security arrangements do not include a nuclear retaliation option, and publicly recognise that retaliation with nuclear weapons has the potential to cause environmental destruction leading to global famine.<sup>12</sup> These umbrella countries can also state publicly that they do not link their national security to nuclear weapons, thereby contributing to the reduced reliance on nuclear weapons in all security strategies as committed to in 2010.

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<sup>11</sup> First NPDI Ministerial Statement, 22 September 2010, found at <http://www.dfat.gov.au/security/npdi-meeting-20100922.html>

<sup>12</sup> Ira Helfand, Nuclear Famine: climate effects of regional nuclear war, April 2012, found at: <http://www.ippnw.org/nuclear-famine.html>

## CANADA Example reporting form

| Delivery vehicles   | State response  |
|---|---|
| Number of nuclear warhead delivery systems by type (missiles, aircraft, submarines, artillery, other)   | None  |
| Reductions (in numbers) in 2012   | None  |
| Aggregate number of delivery systems dismantled in 2012   | None  |
| Nuclear doctrine  | State response  |
| Measures taken or in process to diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies | Reportedly supported calls within NATO for adaptation of declaratory policies in line with U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. Establishment of the NATO Special Advisory and Consultative Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Committee. However, agreed that <i>“Nuclear weapons are a core component of NATO’s overall capabilities for deterrence and defence”</i>   |
| Measures taken or in process to reduce the operational readiness of the reporting State’s nuclear arsenal                                       | N/A   |
| Measures taken or in process to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons  | N/A   |
| Description of negative security assurances (including status and definition) <i>by reporting States</i>  | Through NATO’s new Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, which states <i>“The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote”</i> and <i>“nuclear weapons will not be used or threatened to be used against Non-Nuclear Weapon States that are party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations”</i> |
| Current status and future prospect of the ratification of the relevant protocols to nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties                           | N/A   |
| Current status of consultations and cooperation on entry into force of the relevant protocols on nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties              | N/A   |
| Current status of review of any related reservations about the relevant protocols of nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties by concerned States      | N/A   |

## CANADA Example reporting form (continued)

| Nuclear testing   | State response  |
|---|---|
| Current status of ratification of the Comprehensive-Test-Ban treaty   | Annex II State, ratified 18 December 1998   |
| Current status of the reporting State's policy on continued adherence to the moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions   | N/A   |
| Activities to promote the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the national, regional and international levels  | NPDI cooperative efforts, including joint statements, letters and demarches. Canada has co-hosted a "Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty" ministerial-level event on the margins of the General Assembly high-level meetings in New York in years when Article XIV Conferences of the Treaty are not held. |
| Fissile material  | State response  |
| Aggregate amount of plutonium produced <i>for national security purposes</i> (in metric tons)   | N/A   |
| Aggregate amount of highly enriched uranium produced <i>for national security purposes</i> (in metric tons)   | All U.S. origin HEU has been cleaned out of the country.  |
| Amount of fissile material declared excess for national security policies (in metric tons)  | N/A   |
| Current status (and any future plan), including the amount and year, of declarations to the International Atomic Energy Agency of all fissile material designated by the reporting State as no longer required for military purposes and placement of such material under Agency or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes | N/A   |
| Current status of the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements to ensure the irreversible removal of such fissile material  | N/A   |
| Current status (and any future plan) of the dismantlement or conversion for peaceful uses of facilities for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons   | Through the Global Partnership, Canada funds U.S. led nuclear security projects to convert nuclear reactors and remove Highly Enriched Uranium.   |
| Scheduled policy reviews  | State response  |
| Scope and focus of policy reviews, scheduled or under way, relating to nuclear weapon stocks, nuclear doctrine or nuclear posture   | Review of NATO Strategic Concept and NATO Deterrence and Defence Posture Review completed in 2010 and 2012. Next review and revisions are not scheduled.  |



## CANADA Example reporting form (continued)

| Other measures in support of nuclear disarmament   | State response  |
|--|---|
| <p>Any cooperation among Governments, the United Nations and civil society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities</p>   | <p>NPDI membership; participation in all Nuclear Security Summits to date; participation in NATO's Special Advisory and Consultative Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Committee. Sponsor of UNGA Resolution A/RES/67/53 to establish a Group of Governmental experts on a fissile materials treaty, participant in Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction; active participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative; Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism;</p>   |
| <p>Year and official document symbol of regular reports on the implementation of Article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference</p> | <p>Last report submitted in 2012, NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/10</p>   |
| <p>Activities to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education</p>   | <p>As a member of the International Science and Technology Centre in Moscow and the Science and Technology Centre in Ukraine, Canada has funded over 180 individual research projects engaging over 2,600 former weapons scientists in civilian employment through various research projects and other programmes and activities, including in the area of nuclear and radiological security. At the March 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C., the Prime Minister of Canada stated that Canada would, through the Global Partnership Programme, develop new training projects directed at select States to robustly implement existing nuclear security instruments, including nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament frameworks such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</p> |

## Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences

In each ministerial statement, the NPDI has reaffirmed that any use of nuclear weapons would cause grave consequences for humanity, and threaten its very survival. Yet most NPDI members have not supported the joint statements to that effect as coordinated by Switzerland at the 2012 NPT and UNGA First Committee. While the NPDI hopes “*to contribute to a growing consensus that any perceived security or political advantages of nuclear weapons are outweighed by the grave threat they pose to humanity*”<sup>13</sup>, this is not yet reflected in its actions and proposals.

All NPDI states participated in the March 2013 conference hosted by Norway on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons. It would be logical for the NPDI to reflect some of the outcomes of that conference in its ministerial statement resulting from the April 2013 meeting. That could include welcoming the conference and welcoming NPDI member Mexico’s decision to host a follow-up meeting. It could also include a specific reference to outcomes noted in the Chair’s Summary, namely

- It is unlikely that any state or international body could address the immediate humanitarian emergency caused by a nuclear weapon detonation in an adequate manner and provide sufficient assistance to those affected. Moreover, it might not be possible to establish such capacities, even if it were attempted.
- The historical experience from the use and testing of nuclear weapons has demonstrated their devastating immediate and long-term effects. While political circumstances have changed, the destructive potential of nuclear weapons remains.
- The effects of a nuclear weapon detonation, irrespective of cause, will not be constrained by national borders, and will affect states and people in significant ways, regionally as well as globally.<sup>14</sup>

As the NPDI has already repeated, the only way to prevent the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons is to eliminate the weapons completely. NPDI members could incorporate a reference to a treaty banning nuclear weapons and leading to their elimination as a complimentary step to the current non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. As the NPDI has already taken note of the UN Secretary General’s Five – Point plan for nuclear disarmament, including the possibility of a nuclear weapons convention or framework of agreements, providing additional support to this important step would strengthen existing efforts.

## Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

The NPDI States have made it clear that they value the contributions of nuclear weapons free zone agreements towards building a nuclear weapons free world and that such zones support efforts to maintain non-proliferation norms. Each NPDI statement has reflected on the need to support the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. What the NPDI has not incorporated, and could, is a concerted effort to encourage ratification of existing nuclear weapons free zone agreements by the nuclear weapons states. The NPDI could also discuss other nuclear free zone proposals and their potential relationship with existing non-proliferation and disarmament efforts- including proposals for a zone in the Arctic, and the possibility of creating more single state zones (as in the case of Mongolia).

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<sup>13</sup> First NPDI Ministerial Statement, 22 September 2010, found at <http://www.dfat.gov.au/security/npdi-meeting-20100922.html>

<sup>14</sup> Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Espen Barth Eide Chairman’s Summary, found here: Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Espen Barth Eide

## Education

NPDI members have consistently called for further efforts on disarmament and non-proliferation education, and a number of NPDI members have undertaken national efforts through seminars, sponsoring PhD programmes and more. NPDI members can explicitly expand on the effort to implement Action 22 of the 2010 agreement by announcing national or regional workshops or training courses on any number of topics, including but not limited to: national legislative measures to enact additional protocol agreements; the impact of any use of nuclear weapons on regional trade and economies; global security architecture in a nuclear weapons free world, and more. The NPDI could provide specific financial support for youth activities related to disarmament and non-proliferation, including efforts to bring academics and students to international disarmament discussions, university workshops, doctoral and post-doctoral programmes, to name a few. NPDI members could also include student or civil society representatives on their national delegations to international disarmament discussions, providing a first-hand experience for future practitioners in the field and demonstrating transparency in their own practice.

## Expanding membership

There are distinct benefits to the current composition of the NPDI. There is a clear and direct link with existing U.S. doctrines and strategies which could open doors for substantive discussions with the U.S., the UK and France on NPDI proposals. However, the credibility of the group can be significantly increased by making changes to the current composition, in two ways. The NPDI should first of all consider opening up to allow at least one African nation to join its efforts and share perspectives from that continent. Secondly, for the sake of the credibility of the group, and thus the effectiveness of its work, the NPDI should consider inviting one or two states specifically that are not dependent on the U.S. for their national security strategy.

## Civil Society participation

The NPDI itself can do more to engage with civil society, for example by inviting civil society actors with related expertise to participate in interactive sessions during NPDI meetings, or by inviting (even critical) civil society representatives as respondents to public sessions. NPDI meetings should make room for civil society actors, as well as those with specific technical expertise, to engage directly with meeting participants. Transparency is a necessary confidence building measure, and at least one session should be open to the public. Civil society actors offer a unique perspective and can encourage out-of-the-box thinking. A session of forthcoming conferences should be devoted to civil society presentations. NPDI members can include civil society on their national delegations to multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation forums as a way to ensure transparency and increase accountability, they can also include interested parliamentarians.

